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MANAGEABILITY UNDER THE PROPOSED UNIFORM
CLASS ACTIONS ACT
by Storrow Moss Gordon
Since the adoption of new federal rule 23, the class action procedure has
been the center of intense and often acrimonious debate.' Most of this

debate has centered on the form of class action which permits large numbers
of loosely affiliated plaintiffs to sue for damages. 2 Proponents of this form
of action have hailed it as one of the most socially useful remedies in
history, 3 while detractors have condemned it as inherently wasteful and

potentially destructive.' The debate has not been confined to the ranks of
scholarly commentators and attorneys practicing in the class action field;
the courts themselves have often lined up on one side or the other of this
5

heated argument.
Of all the concepts introduced by rule 23, the manageability requirement
has evoked perhaps the most important judicial response in terms of the
continued viability of the mass class action. 6 Despite the fact that manageability is a vague and judgmental concept, recent federal court decisions
have restricted the discretion of federal courts to finding the manageability
requirement satisfied through the use of flexible procedural tools. 7 Thus,
access to the federal system for the mass class action plaintiff has been
severely restricted.'

Although the state forum remains theoretically available, most of the
current state class action forms are either modelled after new federal rule 23
and follow closely the developments in the federal courts or are based on

older and even more restrictive models. 9 Recently, however, the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws has proposed a
Uniform Class Actions Act I which could, if adopted, significantly broaden
1. Compare

AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF

THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON RULE

23 OF

THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

6 (1972) with

Moore, The Potential Function of the Modern Class Suit, 2 CLASS ACT. REP. 47 (1973).
2. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
3. See, e.g., Pomerantz, New Developments in Class Actions-Has Their Death Knell
Been Sounded? 25 Bus. LAW. 1259 (1970).
4. See, e.g., Kirkham, Complex Civil Litigation-Have Good Intentions Gone Awry?, 70
F.R.D. 199 (1976).
5. Compare Buford v. American Fin. Co., 333 F. Supp. 1243, 1251 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (rule
23(b)(3) used as a device for the solicitation of litigation), with Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94
(10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S.928 (1969) (if there is an error made, let it be made in
favor of and not against the maintenance of a class action).
6. See Schuck, Class Actions Maintainable, in CLASS ACTIONS 89, 120 (1973).
7. See In re Hotel Tel. Charges, 500 F.2d 86 (9th Cir. 1974); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,
479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973), aff'd, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
8. Cf. Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S.332 (1969) (plaintiff class members may not aggregate
their individual claims to reach the $10,000 amount in controversy jurisdictional requisite);
accord, Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973).
9. See Sullivan & Fuchsberg, Major Class Action Considerations, in CLASS ACTION
PRIMER I (J. Fuchsberg ed. 1973).
10. UNIFORM CLASS ACTIONS ACT, adopted by the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws, August 1976, subject to revision by the Style Committee (on file in
Underwood Law Library, Southern Methodist Univeristy) [hereinafter cited as U.C.A.A.].
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the availability of the mass class action in the state courts. This Comment
examines the means by which the Uniform Class Actions Act attempts to
solve the manageability problems which have arisen under the federal rule,
analyzes the policy decisions embodied in the Act, and delineates some of
the consequences of the Act for class action litigants in the state courts.
I.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE CLASS ACTION

The class action device grew out of the bill of peace developed by the
English courts of equity. Intended originally to allow the resolution of
multiple common claims in one proceeding, the bill of peace evolved into a
device which permitted representative suits by a named plaintiff on behalf
of parties similarly situated." As an exception to the general rule that all
parties materially interested in the subject matter of the suit were to be made
parties, 2 the representative action required that common questions predominate over individual questions and that interested persons be so numerous that joinder was impractical. 3 The judgment rendered in such a suit was
binding not only on the parties to the action, but on all persons similarly

situated. 14
In 1842 Federal Equity Rule 48 expressly recognized the representative
action in the federal courts; 5 in Smith v. Swormstedt 6 the United States
Supreme Court recognized that the action was binding on absent class
members. The first state codification of the class action device appeared in
the 1849 amendment to the New York Field Code, incorporating much the
same elements as the bill of peace.17
In the 1938 codification of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure the class
action was embodied in rule 23.18 This rule defined permissible class actions
in terms of the jural relationships of the class members. Three categories
were outlined based on the substantive character of the rights asserted by
the class: the true, hybrid, and spurious categories. 19 The rule did not,
however, define the res judicata effect of each category upon absent class
members since the rulemakers believed that to do so would involve matters
of substantive law beyond the scope of the federal rules. 20 Nevertheless,
federal courts interpreted the rule to provide that a judgment rendered
would be binding on absent class members only in the true or hybrid form of
action. 2' The spurious action, which is the early equivalent of the rule
HI. How v. Tenants of Bromsgrove, I Vern. 22, 23 Eng. Rep. 277 (Ch. 1681).
12. Brown v. Howard, I Eq. Cas. Abr. 163 pl.4, 21 Eng. Rep. 960 (1701).
13. Mayor of York v. Pilkington, I Atk. 282, 26 Eng. Rep. 180 (Ch. 1737).
14. Adair v. New River Co., II Ves. 429, 32 Eng. Rep. 1153 (1805).
15. Equity R. 48, 210 U.S. 508 n.I, 524 (1907).
16. 57 U.S. (16 How.) 288 (1853).
17. 1849 N.Y. Laws, tit. 3, § 119, at 639.
18. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, 308 U.S. 689 (1939).
19. See Murrah, Historical Overview and Perspective on Class Actions, in CLASS ACTIONS,
supra note 6, at 16. A "true" class action was proper where the right sought to be enforced for
the class was joint, common, or secondary. A "hybrid" class action was proper where the right
was several and specific property was the subject of the action. A "spurious" class action
could be maintained where the right was several, a common question of law or fact existed, and
a common relief was sought.
20. See Comment, Adequate Representation, Notice and the New Class Action Rule:
Effectuating Remedies Provided by the Securities Laws, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 889, 891 (1968).
21. Apparently, this reflected the influence of Professor Moore's commentary on the rule.
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23(b)(3) action, became merely an invitation to join. 2 Since the named
plaintiff could not truly represent the class, much of the benefit to absent
class members was lost. In addition, the 1938 codification failed to provide
the courts with workable guidelines for determining the category in which a
particular claim belonged.2 3 Yet the categorical labels applied by the courts
had crucial consequences for the plaintiff class, not only in terms of the res
judicata effect of a judgment but also with respect to a determination of
24
jurisdictional criteria and application of the statute of limitations.
Thus, when the Advisory Committee on Rules drafted the 1966 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure it was generally agreed that
the mechanical definition of class actions in terms of jural relationships had
become unworkable. 25 Federal rule 23 was completely revised to define the
scope and nature of the class action in more practical terms and to ensure
basic procedural fairness in the conduct of the action. In its present form
rule 23 sets certain necessary but not sufficient conditions, such as numerosity of class members, commonality of questions of law or fact, and typicality
26
of claims and adequacy of representation.
The rule additionally describes three types of situations in which the class
action form is justified. Two of these, described in rule 23(b)(1) and (2), are
related in that they are actions thought properly maintainable as class suits
because they are actions which, if brought individually, would affect the
interests of others similarly situated.27 These types of classes, considered to
have a high degree of coherency because of inherent similarity of the class
members' interests, have been regarded by the courts as actions brought
principally for injunctive or declaratory relief. 28 The most significant alteration embodied in new rule 23, however, was the recognition that a representative action brought as a matter of procedural convenience would be
binding on all absent class members unless they affirmatively requested
exclusion from the class. 29 Under rule 23(b)(3) a class action may be proper
if questions of law or fact common to the class predominate over any
questions affecting only individual class members. Thus, rule 23(b)(3) has
come to be regarded by the federal courts as the principal vehicle for class
30
actions seeking damages.
Unlike rule 23(b)(1) or (2) actions, class action treatment is not as clearly
called for in the rule 23(b)(3) situation, 31 but may be convenient, depending
See generally Moore, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Some Problems Raised by the Preliminary Draft, 25 GEO. L.J. 551 (1937).
22. Absent class members were able, however, under this provision, to benefit by waiting
until the case took a favorable turn and then accepting the invitation to join. This is known as
the one-way intervention technique.
23. See, e.g., Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 27 F. Supp. 763 (E.D. Pa. 1938),
rev'd, 108 F.2d 51 (3d Cir. 1939), rev'd on other grounds, 311 U.S. 282 (1940), on remand, 39 F.
Supp. 592 (E.D. Pa.), rev'd, 123 F.2d 979 (3d Cir. 1941).
24. See Moore & Cohn, Federal Class Actions, 32 ILL. L. REV. 307 (1937).
25. Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United
States, Advisory Note, 39 F.R.D. 69, 98-99 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Advisory Note].
26. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
27. Miller, Problems in Administering Judicial Relief in Class Actions under Federal Rule
23(b)(3) 54 F.R.D. 501 (1972).
28. See cases noted in Schuck, supra note 6, at 97, 99.
29.

FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B).

30. See, e.g., Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 397 n.4 (1975).
31. Advisory Note, supra note 25, at 102.
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on the particular facts, to achieve the stated purpose of the rule: "economy
of time, effort, expense and . . . uniformity of decision as to persons
similarly situated." ' 32 As the advisory note recognized, rule 23(b)(3) facilitates class action on behalf of numerous small claimants for whom an action
would otherwise not be feasible in terms of costs and attorney compensation. 33 In this sense the rule 23(b)(3) form of action provides a procedural
device to deal with the problem of a single harmful act resulting in a small
amount of damages to many diverse people.
The effect of the new federal rule was to upset the existing balance of
power between the small claimant and the large corporate defendant by
greatly enlarging the number of possible plaintiffs 34 and thus enlarging the
potential liability of the defendant. Through the aggregation of claims a
collection of plaintiffs with small individual claims could conceivably become a powerful and cohesive economic unit which could effectively oppose a large corporation. The threat of enormous liability on the defendant's
part gave the plaintiff class a strong bargaining tool in settlement
negotiations. 35 The promise of a large recovery by the plaintiff class enabled
the named representative to attract competent and experienced counsel in
complex and lengthy litigation. As a result, many plaintiffs sought to use
rule 23(b)(3) as a tool for redressing massive consumer wrongs and an
alternative means of enforcing consumer protection statutes.
II.

MANAGEABILITY PROBLEMS UNDER RULE

23(b)(3)

It is not surprising, therefore, that defendants tenaciously resisted the
class action form from the outset. Most of the attacks, however, centered on
whether an action could properly be certified as a class action instead of
actually litigating on the merits. 36 The rule 23(b)(3) notion of procedural
convenience requires the court to find not only that the proposed action fits
the (b)(3) description but also that the action is "superior to other available
methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy." 37 The
elements of superiority include (1) the interest of class members in individually controlling their separate actions, (2) the extent and nature of litigation
already commenced, (3) the desirability of concentrating litigation of the
claims in one forum, and (4) the difficulties likely to be encountered in
managing the class action. In the case of a potentially huge class of plaintiffs, it is the manageability aspect of superiority which has posed the most
32. Id. at 102-03.
33. Id. at 104.
34. See Note, Managing the Large Class Action: Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 87 HARV.

L. REV. 426 (1973). Class actions have been filed on behalf of all homeowners in the United
States, Mangano v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary, Inc., 438 F.2d 1187 (3d Cir. 1971),
and on behalf of all persons in the United States, Handy v. General Motors, Inc., 518 F.2d 786
(9th Cir. 1975).
35. Milton Handler has argued that the very size of the potential recovery has engendered a
form of "legalized blackmail" in which the defendant must settle rather than face the threat of
expensive and time consuming litigation. Handler, The Shift from Substantive to Procedural
Innovations in Antitrust Suits-The Twenty-Third Annual Antitrust Review, 71 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 9 (1971).
36. As of 1972, only two federal class actions seeking damages had gone to trial on the
merits, and in both cases the defendant prevailed. See Schlachter, The Casefor the FluidClass
Recovery, I CLASS ACT. REP. 70 (1972), for a discussion of this phenomenon.
37. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
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acute problems for the courts and presented the most formidable barrier to
38
the class action plaintiff.
What precisely constitutes manageability is not entirely clear. Some
courts have merely held that classes exceeding a certain size are inherently
unmanageable. 39 Problems of manageability, however, have been recognized as composed of two principal components, the problems of providing
notice of the institution of the suit to absent class members, and the problems of calculating and distributing damages to the absent class members.4"
A.

The Notice Problems Under FederalRule 23

Unlike the earlier version of rule 23, the 1966 amendment set out measures designed to ensure procedural fairness. 41 Rule 23(c)(2) mandates notice
to absent class members in a rule 23(b)(3) action; in particular, individual
notice to all reasonably ascertainable class members is required. Since the
new rule is designed to eliminate the earlier practice of one-way intervention
on the part of absent class members, 42 the judgment in a rule 23(b)(3) action
is binding on all class members.
Rule 23(c)(2) reflects the concern that due process be accorded class
members not named as parties in the action. In order to protect the interests
of absent class members in individually controlling their own actions, an
interest considered stronger in the rule 23(b)(3) action, class members are
also given the option of excluding themselves from the class and the effect
of the judgment. Thus, rule 23(c)(2) is also designed to effectuate the "optout" provisions.43
For the massive plaintiff class the superficially innocent notice provision
can impose a potentially staggering burden. The cost of identifying, locating,
and mailing notice to millions of individuals can preclude a class action at its
inception. When the claims of individual class members are too small to
make any individual action feasible or to support any interest in individual
control of claims, a strict reading of rule 23(c)(2) is particularly onerous.
Within a few years of the adoption of new rule 23 a substantial body of
case law arose as to the scope of the notice requirement. The issues revolved around three principal questions: (1) whether procedural due process
required notice to the absent class; (2) what form of notice was required by
rule 23(c)(2); and (3) who should pay for the notice. From the beginning,
however, judicial answers to these questions were in irreconcilable conflict,
38. See Shlachter, supra note 36, at 70.
39. See, e.g., United Egg Producers v. Bauer Int'l Corp., 312 F. Supp. 319 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)
(class comprised of all consumers of eggs in the United States held unmanageable); Hackett v.
General Host Corp., 1972 TRADE CAS. (CCH) 73, 879 (E.D. Pa. 1970), appeal dismissed, 455
F.2d 618 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 925 (1972) (denying class status to 1.5 million
purchasers of bread in Philadelphia stores).
40. The UCAA has incorporated to some degree the notions of superiority and manageability. See notes 201-02 infra and accompanying text.
41. Advisory Note, supra note 25, at 99.
42. See note 22 supra. See also Comment, supra note 20, at 916, for a discussion of the
deliberation of the Advisory Committee to the 1966 Rules on this point.
43. With the increasing hostility to class actions, it has been suggested that the federal rule
be amended to require opt-in rather than opt-out provisions. Walsh, Improvements in the
Judicial System: A Summary and Overview, 70 F.R.D. 223, 229 (1976).

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 31

depending to a large degree on the court's view of the usefulness of the class
action device.
Early Case Law. The advisory committee designed the rule 23(c)(2) notice
requirement to fulfill the dictates of due process." In reference to rule
23(d)(2), however, the committee also noted that the need for notice would
decrease as the cohesiveness of the class and the adequacy of representation
increased.45 While early court decisions under the 1966 version of rule 23
recognized that the rule itself required notice, not all agreed with the advisory committee that due process also required it. 6 In Golgow v. Anderson47
the court noted that adequacy of representation and not actual notice to the
class members was the essential requirement of due process necessary to
bind class members to a judgment.4 8 On the other hand, a substantial number
of cases, relying on Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,49 have
held that due process requires notice not only in the rule 23(b)(3) form of
action but in the (b)(1) and (b)(2) forms as well5 0
The courts have also been in conflict as to what form the rule 23(c)(2)
notice should take." The rule itself requires "the best notice practical under
the circumstances, including individual notice to all . . . who can be identified through reasonable effort.' '52 The best notice under the circumstances
of a mass class action is not necessarily equivalent to individual notice,
however, since the economic and administrative difficulties of locating and
notifying individual class members can be formidable. In drafting the notice
provision, the advisory committee apparently took Mullane as its model.53
44. Advisory Note, supra note 25, at 99.
45. Id. at 107. In the rule 23(b)(1) and (2) forms of action, where class cohesiveness and
adequacy of representation are considered substantial, notice is within the discretion of the
court, to be given for the protection of the class or the fair conduct of the action. FED. R. Civ.
P. 23(d)(2).
46. See, e.g., Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Grounds, 292 F. Supp. 619 (D. Kan. 1968)
(holding that due process does not require notice); Booth v. General Dynamics Corp., 264 F.
Supp. 465 (N.D. Il1. 1967).
47. 43 F.R.D. 472 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
48. This notion was drawn from the early decision of Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 43 (1940),
in which the Court characterized the class action as a recognized exception to the general
principles of due process. The Court found that where members of a class not present as actual
parties are in fact adequately represented by those who are present, the former may be bound
by the judgment. Id. at 41. In none of the early cases dealing with the class action was notice
referred to, nor, apparently, given. See, e.g., Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S.
356 (1921). None of these decisions, however, involved a class action device mandating the optout opportunity to class members as does modern rule 23.
49. 339 U.S. 306 (1950). Mullane dealt with the constitutional sufficiency of notice to
beneficiaries in an action brought by a trustee bank for judicial settlement of its accounts. The
Court held that the fundamental requirement of due process was notice reasonably calculated to
apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action; thus, when the identity and location of
absent persons were known, personal notice by mail, rather than notice by publication, was
held to be constitutionally required. Id. at 314-20. Although generally regarded as a landmark
decision on due process notice requirements, Mullane was not a class action.
50. Arey v. Providence Hosp., 55 F.R.D. 62 (D.D.C. 1972); United States exrel. Walker v.
Mancusi, 338 F. Supp. 311 (W.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd, 467 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1972); Clark v.
American Marine Corp., 297 F. Supp. 1305 (E.D. La. 1969).
51. Compare Johnson v. Robinson, 296 F. Supp. 1165 (N.D. I1. 1967) (best practical class
notice was reliable media coverage), with Richland v. Cheatham, 272 F. Supp. 148 (S.D.N.Y.
1967) (actual notice to class members required by rule 23).
52. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2).
53. Pomerantz, The "Notice to the Class" Under the Amended Federal Rule 23, in THE
NEW FEDERAL CLASS ACTION RULE 29, 39 (1968).
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Mullane, however, had rejected any generalized formula for balancing the
interests in bringing a proceeding to finality without impossible obstacles
and the interests of the individual in being afforded an opportunity to be
heard;54 the Court specifically underlined the necessity of considering the
practicalities and peculiarities of each case.55 Accordingly, Booth v. General
Dynamics Corp.,56 a rule 23(b)(3) taxpayer's action, refused to require
individual notice, although it was in fact possible to do so, because the
57
prohibitive cost of notice would render the taxpayer suit device impotent.
The individual notice requirement in rule 23(b)(3) actions does not, however, necessarily sound the death knell of those actions. Rule 23(c)(2)
offered no guidance as to which party should bear the high cost of such
notice and the courts divided on the issue. Some courts held that the named
plaintiff representatives must bear the cost of such notice; 58 some merely
assumed that the burden would fall on the plaintiff.5 9 Others, while requiring
the plaintiffs in the case before them to bear the notice costs, refused to
adopt a rigid rule that plaintiffs in any case must bear the cost of notice since
to do so would frustrate the class action device.' The court in Golgow went
so far as to impose the costs on the corporate defendant because (1) the
defendant was better able to bear the costs of notice; (2) the defendant had
an interest in giving notice since it would afford him the benefits of res
judicata against the entire class; and (3) the plaintiffs were able to present a
prima facie case of breach
of fiduciary duty by the defendant corporation in
61
a preliminary mini-trial.
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin. In 1966 Morton Eisen instituted a class
action under rule 23(b)(3) for alleged violation of the Securities Exchange
Act and the Sherman Act by odd-lot dealers which brought the various
notice issues into sharp foCUS. 62 The class which Eisen sought to represent
54. 339 U.S. at 314. Ironically, in the mass class action these interests are not conflicting
but rather congruent; if substantial obstacles are placed in the path of bringing the proceeding to
finality, the class members will be unlikely to be heard at all. See Gant v. City of Lincoln, 193
Neb. 108, 225 N.W.2d 549 (1975), in which the court recognizes the critical distinction between
the factual context of Mullane and that of the class action.
55. See, e.g., Francis v. Davidson, 340 F. Supp. 351 (D. Md.), aff'd, 409 U.S. 904 (1972),
which adopted a balancing approach to the due process aspect of notice in rule 23(b)(2) actions.
56. 264 F. Supp. 465 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
57. Similarly, the court in Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), concerned
with encouraging the "therapeutic value" of the mass class action in the securities regulation
field, paid particular attention to what form of notice would be reasonable in the particular suit.
Notice by publication was considered to be reasonable in view of the cohesive financial
community which regularly read the Wall Street Journal. Id. at 501.
58. Herbst v. Able, 47 F.R.D. I I (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Lesch v. Chicago & Eastern Ill. Ry., 279
F. Supp. 908 (N.D. Il1. 1968).
59. Booth v. General Dynamics Corp., 264 F. Supp. 465 (N.D. Il. 1967).
60. Berland v. Mack, 48 F.R.D. 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
61. 43 F.R.D. at 487-500.
62. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 41 F.R.D. 147 (S.D.N.Y.), motion to dismiss appeal
denied, 370 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1035 (1967), rev'd and remanded, 391
F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968), on remand, 50 F.R.D. 471 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), decision withheld pending
submission of further information, 52 F.R.D. 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), class action certified, 479
F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated and remanded, 417 U.S. 156 (1974). Not surprisingly, one
judge characterized the action as a "Frankenstein monster posing as a class action." 391 F.2d
at 572 (Lumbard, J., dissenting). After eight years the case never reached trial on the merits. It
stands as a paradigm of the extent to which procedural battles have obstructed utilization of the
class action device.
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was composed of six million members, of which two million could be
individually identified with reasonable effort; 63 Eisen, himself, had a claim
for only $70.1 If Eisen were required to mail individual notice to each of the
identifiable class members, the cost would have been a prohibitive
$225,000;65 on the other hand, due to his small claim Eisen was of necessity
required to proceed through a class action if he was to retain competent
counsel.
In the first proceeding, Eisen I, the district court held that due process
and rule 23(c)(2) required individual notice to the identifiable class members
and dismissed the case practical financial limitations rendered the plaintiff
unable to comply.' In Eisen 11,67 a confusing and rather enigmatic decision,
the Second Circuit stated that it was unable to arrive at any satisfactory
conclusion as to the propriety of employing notice by publication. While
stating that the cost of notice must rest on the plaintiff representative, 68 the
court noted that in Mullane the party required to furnish individual notice
had been a large banking institution rather than a small individual claimant.
After underscoring both plaintiff's argument that publication was the best
notice practical under the circumstances and defendant's contention that
cost could not be a factor in considering due process or rule 23 require69
ments, the court remanded the case for further evidentiary hearings.
On remand the district court required individual notice to 2,000 large
claimants, and similar notice to 5,000 randomly selected small claimants in
addition to notice by publication and notice to brokers.70 Neither due process nor rule 23 required individual notice for all reasonably identifiable class
members. Instead the court stressed the adequacy of representation factor
present when notice was structured so as to reach class members of all
shades of opinion 7' and the importance of the class action in implementing
securities regulations. Thus, after conducting a mini-trial the court imposed
72
ninety percent of the cost of notice on the defendant.
In Eisen 111771 the court of appeals again struck down the district court's
decision, holding that rule 23(c)(2) required plaintiff to notify the two million
identifiable class members individually without regard to any other considerations. The Supreme Court affirmed. 74 Individual notice under rule
23(c)(2) was held to be mandatory even though it would effectively frustrate
the petitioner's attempt to vindicate securities law policy. 75 Rejecting the
notion that a mini-trial could justify imposing the costs of the notice on the
defendant, the Court found that when the relationship between plaintiff and
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

52 F.R.D. at 257.
417 U.S. at 156.
Id.
41 F.R.D. at 147.
391 F.2d at 569.
Id.at 570.
Id.at 569-70.
52 F.R.D. at 267-68.
Id. at 266.
Id.at 272.
479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973).
417 U.S. 156 (1974).
Id.at 175-76.
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defendant was truly adversarial, the plaintiff must bear the cost of initial
76
notice to the class.
The Effect of Eisen. The Court's ruling was clear on one point, namely that
a rule 23(b)(3) suit is to be dismissed unless the plaintiff has the financial
resources to fund initial individual notice to all reasonably identifiable class
members. Thus, the class suit brought by large numbers of claimants with
individually small but collectively substantial economic injuries has been
effectively precluded in federal court.
The crucial question of whether due process itself required such notice
was by no means so definitely settled. Although the Court in Eisen IV noted
the advisory committee's underlying concern with due process in drafting
rule 23(c)(2), and discussed extensively the holding in Mullane, it found that
notice was required by the rule, "quite apart from what due process may
require." While the Court intimated that adequacy of representation might
not in itself satisfy due process requirements, it specifically held that the
rule 23(c)(2) notice requirement did not by its terms apply to class actions for
injunctive or declaratory relief under rule 23(b)(1) or (2).
Some courts, however, read Eisen IV to stand for the proposition that the
notice requirements of rule 23(c)(2) were based on due process requirements
and thus applied to (b)(1) and (2) actions as well.78 To hold that due process
itself requires individual notice is to hold that a state cannot adopt a less
restrictive notice provision in its own class action rule. Recognizing the
vitiating effect such a holding would have on the class action device, a
79
number of courts soon refused to follow that interpretation of Eisen IV.
Recently, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in United States v. Allegheny
Ludlum Industries, Inc. ,8o held that due process did not require individualized notice in rule 23(b)(2) actions. Subsequently, the Seventh Circuit 8' indicated its concurrence in this conclusion. 82 At least one state supreme court has followed this less restrictive reading.83
76. Id. at 177-78.
77. Id.at 177 n.14.
78. See, e.g., Ellison v. Rock Hill, 64 F.R.D. 415 (D.S.C. 1974); Alexander v. Avco Corp.,
380 F. Supp. 1282 (M.D. Tenn. 1974).
79. See Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1011
(1975), for an excellent analysis of the problem.
80. 517 F.2d 826 (5th Cir. 1975). An ambiguous footnote in Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393,
397 n.4 (1975), was cited as precedent.
81. Bijeol v. Benson, 513 F.2d 965 (7th Cir. 1975) (Sosna requires re-evaluation of the
decision in Schrader v. Selective Serv., 470 F.2d 73 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1085
(1972), which held that due process requires notice in all class actions) (dictum).
82. Since a rule 23(b)(2) action may be brought not only for injunctive but also for monetary
relief, if the principal objective of the suit is injunctive, this conclusion encourages a mechanistic rather than practical approach to notice requirements. Although intended originally to be
merely descriptive of situations in which the class action was appropriate, the label attached to
the suit now has drastic consequences for the viability of the action. In Freeway v. Motor
Convoy, 19 F.R. Serv. 2d 650 (N.D. Ga. 1974), for example, the court sought to avoid the
prohibitive costs of notice to the class by certifying the action under rule 23(b)(2). In doing so,
the court focused on whether the relief sought was principally injunctive or monetary and not
on the needs of class members.
83. Gant v. City of Lincoln, 193 Neb. 108, 225 N.W.2d 549 (1975). The court refused to
read Eisen IV as relying on due process, distinguishing Mullane because no member of the
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The Damage Problems of Federal Rule 23

Rule 23 provides no express guidelines for determining whether a class
action is the superior means of adjudicating the damages aspects of numer-

ous individual claims. 84 Yet in the mass class action, these problems can be

acute. If each class member is required to prove damages individually, the
burden on the court will be heavy.15 Moreover, when individual recovery is
small, many class members will be unlikely to do so in view of the expense
involved. It might prove possible, however, to calculate damages solely on
the basis of defendant's records. 86 If a defendant had uniformly over-

charged consumers during a specified time period, for example, damages
might be easily computed. But even when liability and damages can be
calculated, numerous class members may be unidentified, and, thus, seeking
out and distributing their share in the recovery can be an overwhelming
task.87 Yet to deny recovery when it proves infeasible for individual class
members to prove their claims, or, alternatively, when distribution to a
group of unidentified class members is impossible, would be to leave large

sums of wrongfully acquired funds in the defendant's hands. The problem,
then, is twofold: first computing damages of the class members, and secondly distributing damages to the class members.
Fluid Recovery Model. One hotly-disputed solution to these problems is
the fluid-class recovery. Under this model the issue of the defendant's
liability would first be litigated. Then, instead of requiring each class member to present a verified claim for his own damages in order-to compute the
extent of defendant's liability, the court would allow plaintiff to prove
defendant's gross damage to the class as a whole. At this point, a damage
fund would be established; after deducting administrative costs of managing

the fund, each individual class member able to prove his own damages
would be recompensed. Any amount remaining because class members did
not prove damages or could not be found would be distributed in such a
fashion as would substantially benefit the whole class. 88 Not every injured
interested class in that case was a party to the suit and their interests were adverse to the
plaintiff bank. Id. at I1I, 225 N.W.2d at 552. The court stated "we still adhere to the general
rule which dispenses with such notice in representative actions." Id. at 112,225 N.W.2d at 553.
84. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 does not discuss remedies except in rule 23(b)(2) to delineate
situations in which injunctive or declaratory relief is proper. The Advisory Note pointed to
situations in which use of the rule 23(b)(3) form of action would be improper because individual
questions of damages and liability would cause the action to degenerate into multiple law suits
(e.g., mass fraud or mass accident cases). Advisory Note, supra note 25, at 103.
85. See Simon, Class Actions-Useful Tool or Engine of Destruction, 55 F.R.D. 375, 377
(1973). One approach to the problem of calculating damages to individual class members has
been to sever liability and damage issues with proof of damages to be determined at a later date
by a special master. See, e.g., Terrell v. Household Goods Carriers' Bureau, 494 F.2d 16 (5th
Cir.), cert. dismissed, 419 U.S. 987 (1974).
86. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 52 F.R.D. 253, 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), in which the
district court found that damages could be calculated from defendant's records without requiring individual proof of damage claims to be filed.
87. Miller, supra note 27, at 506.
88. This might include price reductions of the product or service involved in the suit,
rebates to consumers, and funding of consumer or governmental agencies involved with the
particular subject matter of the suit. For a more detailed outline of fluid recovery in practice see
Comment, The Cy Pres Solution to the Damage DistributionProblems of Mass Class Actions, 9
GA. L. REV. 893, 904-05 (1975).
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class member would necessarily recover his share of the damages and some
89
nonclass members might receive benefits.
The feasibility of this procedure rests on two necessary components. It
first requires that the court deal with the whole class as an entity entitled to
recover its aggregate damages. 90 Traditionally, however, courts have treated
the class action as a multi-party device in which each class member must
step forward to claim his own damages and in which the defendant has the
opportunity to contest each claim. 9' It requires, secondly, that the court in
92
distributing damages adopt an approach analogous to the cy pres doctrine.
Courts, however, have generally viewed the class action for damages as a
device to compensate individual class members. 93
Full compensation of individuals is a primary goal of the fluid recovery
model. The creation of a fund which an efficient centralized claims administration may use to locate class members and assist in substantiating their
claims can actually maximize individual recovery. 4 Yet a distribution system which contemplates that some class members will never recover and
other nonclass members will receive "windfall" benefits clearly has other
primary goals as well. In fact, the fluid recovery system is designed to
prevent unjust enrichment. 95 Fluid recovery is justified by proponents as a
96
deterrent to certain mass injuries, even when no compensation is possible.
The availability of such a procedure is said to make flexible solutions to
class damages problems possible when the exact scope of the problem
becomes clear. 97
Fluid recovery is not a panacea for all damage-related manageability
problems in the mass class action. The plaintiff must still prove and calculate aggregate damages. This does not necessarily mean that defendant's
records must affirmatively show the exact amount of damages; proponents
of the fluid recovery have vigorously argued that computers, statistical
techniques, and sampling methods may be used to prove damages.9 Plaintiff
must also show that distribution will in the main benefit injured class
members. For example, if only limited numbers of class members can be
89. For example, if the court were to order a price reduction, consumers presently using
the product which is the subject of litigation, who were not users at the time of injury, will
receive an undeserved benefit. See Shlachter, supra note 36, at 73.
90. See McClellan, Difficulties Likely to be Encountered in the Management of a Class
Action: The Determination and Distribution of the Damage Award in Antitrust and Related
Suits, Feb. 22, 1974 (unpublished thesis in Underwood Law Library, Southern Methodist
University).
91.

See Moore, supra note 1, at 61.

92. The cy pres doctrine, originally developed in the law of trusts, was designed to allow
the substitution of a charitable object approaching the original purpose as closely as possible
when that purpose had become impossible to fulfill. G. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS &
TRUSTEES § 431 (2d ed. 1964). Under the fluid recovery model the damage fund would similarly
be used for the "next best" purpose where returning damages to each individual class member
would prove impossible.
93. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. American Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 45 (D.N.J. 1971).
94. FederalConsumer Class Action Legislation, 4 CLASS AcT. REP. 3, 18 (1975).
95. See Schlachter, supra note 36, at 70.
96. Note, The Cost-Internalization Case for Class Actions, 21 STAN. L. REV. 383, 419
(1969).
97.

See Kronisch v. Howard Say. Inst., 133 N.J. Super. 124, 335 A.2d 587 (1975).

98. See Shlachter, supra note 36, at 74-75, for a description of the use of sophisticated
techniques in proving damages to the class entity. These techniques are essential where
overcharges are not uniform and the exact number of class members is not ascertainable.
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located, the fluid recovery system may be inappropriate. 99 Moreover, the
fluid recovery model may be most appropriate when its deterrent effects
serve some clearly articulated public policy. Thus, the model has been thrust

upon courts most strongly where it augments securities or antitrust laws
which are clearly designed to deter violators.l°0

Defendants have strenuously objected to the fluid recovery model on a
number of grounds. First, they have argued that fluid recovery would deny
them the opportunity to contest damage claims and would improperly dis-

tribute damages to those not actually harmed. 1 ' Secondly, opponents of

fluid recovery stress the added burdens of time and effort the model will

impose on the court. 10 2 Calculation of aggregate economic damage may be
extremely difficult. In addition, the court must assume management of the
damage fund. With no procedural guidelines and limited case precedent,0 3
the court itself must develop some innovative form of cy pres distribution
which will significantly benefit the class.1°' Finally, the court must oversee
the process of identifying, locating, and notifying class members, and ensur-

ing receipt of their proportionate share of the recovery.
Given the fact that mass class actions, even in the absence of fluid
recovery, are often complex, protracted, and impose special burdens of

supervision on the courts in order to protect absent class members, 0 5 courts
have been particularly critical of procedures which would increase adminis-

99. Defense counsel Michael Melina has argued that the fluid recovery device would be of
only limited utility if strict standards for proof of damages and class benefits are imposed.
Melina, The Search for the Pot of Gold, Fluid Class Recovery as a Consumer Remedy in
Antitrust Cases, 41 ANTITRUST L.J. 301 (1972).
100. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner at 18, Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974),

reprinted in LAW BRIEFS, BRIEFS AND PETITIONS. UNITED
7 TRADE REGULATION SERIES No. 4, at 81, 100.

STATES SUPREME COURT,

1973-74

TERM,

101. See, e.g., Brief for Respondents at 35, Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156
(1974), reprinted in LAW BRIEFS, supra note 100, at 149, 199. Proponents have countered that
since the defendant has the opportunity to contest the amount of aggregate damages fully,
adequate procedural safeguards are present. See, e.g., Brief for State of Calfornia, Amicus
Curiae at 3, Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974), reprinted in LAW BRIEFS, supra
note 100, at 423, 431. In addition, they have pointed to various procedural devices which by
analogy support recovery of damages by those not actually injured. For example, FED. R. Civ.
P. 23.1 permits derivative suits by shareholders which may benefit those who were not
shareholders at the time of the injury. Thomas Barnard has pointed out that in some title VII
actions involving back pay, the courts have come close to awarding fluid recovery rather than
concentrating on injury to each class member. Barnard, Title VII Class Actions: The Recovery
State, 16 WM. & MARY L. REV. 507 (1975). Agency actions also permit similar recovery
devices. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 216(c) (1970) (allowing unclaimed damages assessed for violation
of the Fair Labor Standards Act to revert to the United States Treasury).
102. Even when no fluid recovery is contemplated, the class action device demands that the
court abandon the traditionally passive judicial role for an active one designed to protect absent
class members.
103. See notes 127-33 infra and accompanying text.
104. If, however, the subject of litigation is an expensive product not likely to be bought
again soon (e.g., a car), the simple alternative of reducing the price for future consumers is
unlikely to benefit those consumers originally injured. There may, in fact, be no "next best"
class whose recovery will substantially benefit the class bringing suit. See Federal Consumer
Class Action Legislation, supra note 94, at 23-24, for a discussion of possible approaches to this
problem. Counsel may be of great assistance to the court by submitting a proposed distribution
plan at the certification hearing. Indeed, it has been argued that the ultimate shape of recovery
will depend heavily on the ingenuity of plaintiff's counsel in devising such a plan. Shlachter,
supra note 36, at 74. The ultimate burden of weighing and approving the plan must, however,
fall on the court and it has been questioned whether the traditional equity powers of the court go
so far. See Rifkind, Are We Asking Too Much of Our Courts, 70 F.R.D. 96, 102 (1976).
105. See findings reported in AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS, supra note 1, at 13.
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trative burdens. 1°6 Indeed, some courts have held that the small individual

recoveries associated with the mass class action do not justify the burdens
imposed on the court. 7
Thirdly, opponents of the fluid recovery device have pointed to its poten-

tially devastating effects on the defendant. When the plaintiff class numbers
08
in the millions, aggregate damages may exceed the defendant's net worth.'
On the other hand, individual class members may be uninterested in the
small recovery to which they are entitled.1°9 Thus, when the mass class
action permits an award which "shocks the conscience," some courts have
held that the class action is per se not superior. 110 For the same reasons class
actions based on statutes which permit substantial minimum recovery have
been consistently denied certification as carrying "to an absurd and stultifying extreme" the private enforcement device."'
Fluid Recovery and the Courts. Courts have been reluctant to endorse the
fluid recovery model. In City of Philadelphia v. American Oil Co. ,"l2 a price

fixing suit brought on behalf of four classes, including one retail consumer
class estimated to number from six to fifteen million members, the court
expressly rejected the fluid recovery device, focusing primarily on the
problem of distribution." 3 Adopting the position that the function of the
class suit is solely compensatory, the court pointed out that the proposed
fluid recovery remedy of reducing the price of the gas at the pump for a
specified period would provide a windfall benefit to those who had moved

into the region after the over-charge occurred while denying rightful recovery to those who had since left." 4 The fact that the defendant would retain
its ill-gotten gains, although acknowledged," 5 was considered irrelevant.
For this reason the court refused to certify the action on behalf of the retail
consumer class.116
Eisen III also considered and rejected the fluid recovery device." 7 The

Second Circuit, focusing on the legality of calculating aggregate class damages, held that fluid recovery violated due process.1 8 In addition, the court
106. The actual number and type of class actions as well as the administrative burden
involved are the subject of considerable debate. Compare Kirkham, supra note 4, at 204-05,
with Moore, The A.B.A., The Congress and Class Actions: A Report, 3 CLASs ACT. REP. 36,
38-39 (1974).
107. See, e.g., In re Hotel Tel. Charges, 500 F.2d 86 (9th Cir. 1974).
108. See Kirkham, supra note 4, at 207.
109. This phenomenon has led to charges that the class action has been simply a means of
stirring up litigation designed to benefit plaintiff attorneys rather than providing a forum for
already existing claims. See Simon, supra note 85, at 377.
110. Kline v. Caldwell, Banker & Co., 508 F.2d 226 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
963 (1975); Marks v. San Francisco Real Estate Bd., 69 F.R.D. 353 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
Ill. Shields v. First Nat'l Bank, 56 F.R.D. 442 (D. Ariz. 1972); Ratner v. Chemical Bank
N.Y. Trust Co., 54 F.R.D. 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
112. 53 F.R.D. 45 (D.N.J. 1971).
113. Id. at 71-72.
114. Id. at 72.

115. Id. at 73.

116. Those classes allowed to proceed with the action under rule 23(b)(3), a class of taxicab
companies (numbering 550), a class of bulk purchasers of gasoline (numbering 10,000), and a
class of governmental entities, were not enormous, were stable, identifiable, and had kept
accurate records of the transactions involved. Id. at 74.
117. 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973). See notes 62-77 supra and accompanying text for a
discussion of the procedural background of the case.
118. Id. at 1018. Exactly why the aggregate damages method was violative of due process
was never articulated by the court.
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noted that calculation of damages under an aggregate method would be
impermissible under rule 23. The precedents on which the court relied" 9
both acknowledge the usefulness of the class action device and are far from
clear precedents for the disapproval of fluid recovery. 20 In deciding Eisen
IV, moreover, the Supreme Court expressly reserved judgment on the
questions of whether fluid recovery is constitutional, and whether it is
permitted by rule 23.2l

Since Eisen III no federal court has approved fluid recovery, but several
cases have expressly disapproved the device. The Ninth Circuit in In re
Hotel Telephone Charges2 2 held that fluid recovery violates the Rules Enabling Act 123 by altering the defendant's substantive rights. In addition, the
court focused on the heavy burden which the mass class suit would impose
on the court. Weighing that burden against the de minimis amount of each
individual claim after administrative expenses were deducted, the court held
the benefit to the class could not justify the class action form. 24 The court
also found that the class members were unlikely to be interested in the small
recovery; to allow the suit to proceed would be, in effect, to create an action

where one had not actually existed.
26
explicitly rejected.

25 The

deterrent function of the suit was

The precedents favoring fluid recovery have been somewhat limited in
scope. Bebchick v. Public Utilities Commission,'2 7 involving an illegal fare

increase by a transit company, allowed computation of damages from defendant's records in order to establish a damage fund, but was not a class
action. The court held that the total overcharge must be refunded even

though returning the funds to individual consumers might be infeasible and
relied upon a regulatory commission to carry out the distribution. 28 In
suggesting that the fund be used to offset future increase requests or lower119. Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969), and Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251
(1972).
120. Snyder held that class members could not aggregate damages to achieve the $10,000
amount in controversy required for federal jurisdiction. The Second Circuit evidently regarded
the holding as a disapproval of aggregate damage computation in general. The holding has been
more narrowly read by commentators as a jurisdictional decision based on the mandate of rule
82 that the federal rules cannot extend the jurisdiction of the federal courts. See Note, supra
note 34, at 450. In Hawaii, an antitrust action brought by the state as parens patriae to recover
for damages to the state economy in general, the Court denied recovery. Certain passages
emphasizing the computation of antitrust damages on an individual basis were read by the
Second Circuit to prohibit recovery of aggregate class damages. The decision, however, was
based on the potential for double recovery which existed when a state recovered for injury to
quasi-sovereign interests because the state was not required to distribute the recovery to its
citizens and the judgment would not be res judicata. See Note, supra note 34, at 451.
121. 417 U.S. 156, 172 n.10 (1974).
122. 500 F.2d 86 (9th Cir. 1974). See also Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 94,397 (C.D. Cal. 1974); In re Memorex Security Cases, 61 F.R.D. 88 (N.D.
Cal. 1973).
123. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1970).
124. 500 F.2d at 91. But see Cosgrove v. First & Merchant's Nat'l Bank, 20 F.R. Serv. 2d
1230 (E.D. Va. 1975) (an individual can vindicate his rights at the expense of his pocketbook).
125. 500 F.2d at 91.
126. Id. at 92. The court insisted that although antitrust remedies were designed to deter
violations, recovery was limited to compensating injured parties. See 3B MOORE's FEDERAL
PRACTICE 23.45, at 893 (Supp. 1976-77), commenting that the case reflects a belated recognition that initial manageability problems cannot be worked out in the course of the proceedings.
127. 318 F.2d 187 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 913 (1963).
128. Id. at 204.
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ing present rates, the court clearly endorsed a fluid recovery type of distribution.
In Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 2 9 a class action seeking recovery of taxi fare
overcharges, the California Supreme Court allowed computation of aggregate damages from defendant's records but indicated that individual class
members would have to prove their own damages. The case was eventually
settled, the defendants agreeing to distribute the settlement fund in the form
of fare reductions. 3 ' In approving the settlement agreement, the court also
relied on the existence of a regulatory authority to ensure distribution.
West Virginia v. Charles Pfizer & Co. 131 involved a settlement of a class
action brought by the attorneys general of six states on behalf of retail

purchasers, wholesalers, consumers, and governmental agencies. At the
time the 39.6 million dollar damage fund was established no conclusive
precedent existed to show that fluid distribution of damages by a court on a
very large scale was manageable. Employing a special master and the
intensive cooperation of plaintiff's counsel, the court, through a sophisticated utilization of data processing, advertising, and market testing techniques, successfully returned a substantial portion of the fund to individual
consumers.1 32 Ultimately, total administrative fees were only slightly higher
than the interest monies earned on the settlement fund.133 The experience in
Pfizer appears to support the observation of one commentator that it is only
the rare case which is unmanageable as such; 34 it is, rather, the thought of
adversely affecting judicial efficiency by undertaking such a complex and

protracted task which judges have in mind when dismissing the class as
unmanageable.
Like federal rule 23, the newly revised New York Class Action Act makes

no mention of damages. 35 The practice commentary on the Act states,36
however, that the statute appears to sanction the so-called fluid recovery. 1
The federal consumer class action legislation currently pending in Congress 37 has been redrafted specifically to include the aggregate damages
remedy. The federal bill expressly finds that the proposed remedy is neces-

sary because (1) the protection of the FTC has proved inadequate, 138 and (2)
129. 67 Cal. 2d 695, 433 P.2d 732, 63 Cal. Rptr. 729 (1967). The action had been brought
under CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 382 (West 1972).
130. Shlacter, supra note 36, at 71 n.20.
131. 314 F. Supp. 710 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 440 F.2d 1079(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404U.S.
871 (1971).
132. See Lebedoff, OperationMoney Back, 4 CLASS AcT. REP. 147 (1975), for the report of
the special master appointed to distribute the settlement fund. Although the report indicates
how complex the distribution process can be, it demonstrates that with ingenuity and vigorous
assistance of counsel, the distribution is possible. The report also underscores the critical
importance of the existence of an aggregate damage fund to pay for the large numbers of
personnel and technical assistance necessary to accomplish the distribution.
133. Id. at 147.
134. Dam, Class Actions: Efficiency, Compensation, Deterrence and Conflict of Interest, 4
J. LEGAL STUD. 47, 53 (1975).
135. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW §§ 901-909 (McKinney 1976).
136. McLaughlin, Practice Commentary, N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 905, at 343 (McKinney
1976).
137. Several bills relating to this subject have been introduced but as yet none have been
reported out of committee. For the text of the most recent draft of the Senate version see
Proposed FederalConsumer Class Action Legislation-lI, 4 CLASS ACT. REP. 342 (1975).
138. The proposed bill would re-open the jurisdictional doors closed by Snyder v. Harris,
394 U.S. 332 (1969), and Zahn v. International Paper, 414 U.S. 29 (1973), by permitting
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state laws have not kept pace with the "modern nature of injuries perpetuated through unfair or deceptive acts or practices, in that the aggregate
magnitude of such injuries is large but the claims of individual consumers
are typically too small to justify the cost of litigation. ' 139 Recently, New
Jersey became the first state expressly to authorize the fluid recovery
device. 40 Although no decisions utilizing the procedure have yet been
handed down, the availability of fluid recovery has already been recognized
as a means of overcoming initial manageability problems. 141 Thus, fluid
recovery has gained increasing legislative support.
III.

THE SOLUTION UNDER THE UNIFORM CLASS ACTIONS ACT

A.

Notice

42

the UCAA was tailored to give the class action
As originally drafted,
plaintiff representing large numbers of small claimants maximum access to
the courts.1 43 In certain instances the court would be permitted to waive the
notice requirement altogether. 14 Thus, the court would also be given discretion as to whether a plaintiff class member could be allowed to request
exclusion from the class. 14 Maximum flexibility would also be afforded the
court in determining who should bear the cost of initial notice.' 46 These
provisions reflect the conclusion of the special committee that due process
does not require personal mailed notice.
The final draft of the notice provision 147 significantly altered the original in
aggregation of class member's individual claims to reach a $25,000 jurisdictional amount in
controversy. Consumer Class Action Act of 1976 § 5(b); see note 137 supra.
139. Id. § 2(b)(1), (2).
140. N.J. Civ. PRAC. R. 4:32-2(c) provides: "In any class action, the judgment may, consistent with due process of law, confer benefits upon a fluid class whose members may be, but
need not have been, members of the class in suit." Compare the more complicated guidelines
for fluid recovery in U.C.A.A. § 15.
141. See Kronisch v. Howard Sav. Inst., 133 N.J. Super. 124, 335 A.2d 587 (1975), rev'd and
remanded on other grounds, 143 N.J. Super. 423, 363 A.2d 376 (1976).
142. The text of the third tentative draft is set out in The ProposedUniform Class Actions
Act, 4 CLASS ACT. REP. 181 (1975).
143. See Prefatory Note of the Special Committee on Uniform Class Actions Act, 4 CLASS
ACT. REP. 181-82 (1975).
144. Proposed Uniform Class Actions Act, Third Draft, § 6.
145. Id. § 7(a).
146. Id. § 6(g).
147. U.C.A.A. § 7 provides:
Notice of Action
(a) Following certification, the court by order, after hearing, shall direct the
giving of notice to the class.
(b) The notice, based on the certification order and any amendment of the
order, shall include:
(I) a general description of the action, including the relief sought, and the
names and addresses of the representative parties;
(2) a statement of the right under Section 8 of a member of the class to be
excluded from the action by filing an election to be excluded, in the manner
specified, by a certain date;
(3) a description of possible financial consequences on the class;
(4) a general description of any counterclaim being asserted by or against the
class, including the relief sought;
(5) a statement that the judgment, whether favorable or not, will bind all
members of the class who are not excluded from the action;
(6) a statement that any member of the class may enter an appearance either
personally or through counsel;
(7) an address to which inquiries may be directed; and
(8) any other information the court deems appropriate.
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several respects. In doing so, it limited, but by no means eliminated, access
to the courts for the mass class action plaintiff. Under the present version of
48
the Act the court has no discretion as to whether notice must be given;
initial notice to the class is required for any category of class action. Thus, a
class representative could not avoid the notice requirement altogether merely by arguing that the relief sought is principally injunctive rather than

monetary. 149
Depending on the nature of the claim asserted, however, the court would
have flexibility in tailoring the form of notice to the particular case. Absent
class members whose individual damage estimates exceed $100 are required
to be given personal and mailed notice if their identities can be ascertained
with reasonable diligence. 150 This provision protects class members with
substantial interests by allowing them to opt out of the class or participate in
the action. Moreover, even if the action must be dismissed because the
plaintiff cannot afford the cost of notice, the alleged wrong is theoretically
less likely to languish for lack of a practical form if individual members will
have enough at stake to protect their own interests. Class members whose
claims are below $100 or who seek only injunctive or declaratory relief need
receive only notice reasonably calculated to apprise them of the pendency of
the action.' 5'
Under the Act the courts must consider other factors in determining the
form of notice. Among these are the interests of the class, the nature of the
relief requested, the cost of notifying the members of the class, and the
possible prejudice to absent members who do not receive notice."' Thus,
(c) The court's order shall prescribe the manner of notification to be used and
specify the members to be notified. In determining the manner and form of the
notice to be given, the court shall consider the interests of the class, the relief
requested, the cost of notifying the members of the class, and the possible
prejudice to members who do not receive notice.
(d) Each class member, not a representative party, whose potential monetary
recovery or liability is estimated to exceed $100 shall be given personal or
mailed notice if his identity and whereabouts can be ascertained by the exercise
of reasonable diligence.
(e) For class members not given personal or mailed notice under Subsection
(d), the court shall provide, as a minimum, a means of notice reasonably
calculated to apprise the members of the class of the pendency of the action.
Techniques designed to assure effective communication of information concerning commencement of the action shall be used which may include personal
or mailed notice, notification by means of newspaper, television, radio, posting
in public or other places, and distribution through trade, union, public interest or
other appropriate groups.
(f) The plaintiff shall advance the expense of notice under this section if there
is no counterclaim asserted. If a counterclaim is asserted the expense of notice
shall be allocated as the court orders in the interest of justice.
(g) The court may order that steps be taken to minimize the expense of
notice.
148. U.C.A.A. § 7(a).
149. See note 82 supra.
150. U.C.A.A. § 7(d). For a discussion of what constitutes reasonable diligence see Dennis
v. Saks & Co., 20 F.R. Serv. 2d 994 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
151. Depending on the circumstances, effective notice may be had through a variety of
methods, including newspaper, TV, or radio bulletins, posting in public places or distribution
through groups whose communications might be expected to reach class members. Cf. In re
Arizona Dairy Prod. Litigation, 1975 TRADE CAS. (CCH) 60,395 (D. Ariz. 1975) (publication of
notice on defendant's milk cartons would prove more effective than mailed notice).
152. U.C.A.A. § 7(c). Section 7(e), however, speaks of "effective communication." To the
extent that effective communication to each individual class member is required, the court's
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the courts must balance the interests of the class members in receiving
notice against their interest in having an action designed to vindicate their
rights proceed to trial on the merits. When a class member's monetary
claims are small, his interest in receiving notice is minimal since it is unlikely
53
that he will exercise his right to retain counsel, intervene, or opt out.
When the nature of the claim is such that adequacy of representation is
likely to be maximized 154 or the class member has no right to request
exclusion from the class,' his interest in participating in the action is also
likely to be minimal. Further, the Act specifically permits the court to
consider the cost of the form of notice and, by implication, whether the form
of notice proposed will bar the action at its inception; if so, the court
apparently has discretion to order a less demanding form of notice.
The present draft, however, does not permit court discretion in allocating
the cost of notice. In the absence of a counterclaim by the defendant, the
claimant is required to advance the expense of notice. The deep-pocket
rationale advanced in Dolgow' 56 is correctly rejected. While the Commissioners recognized that the defendant's interest in a counterclaim may
justify imposition of some or all of the burden of notice, 57 the notion that
the defendant's interest in the res judicata benefit of the class action is great
58
enough to produce the same result is not followed.'
The Act expressly permits the court to order steps designed to minimize
the expense of the notice. 159 In light of the general policy requiring plaintiffs
to assume the costs of initial notice, the Act contemplates minimizing the
expense of notice through strictly non-financial cooperation on the defendant's part. Since the court may tailor the form of notice with the cost of
notice in mind, however, placing the expense of notice on the plaintiff is
much less likely to emasculate the mass consumer class action at the outset.
flexibility in structuring notice will be restricted. Thus, the interaction between § 7(c) and § 7(e)
is somewhat confused.
153. See Burman, Class Actions in New York: A Terminal Case Gets Statutory Relief, 4
CLASS ACT. REP. 281, 284 (1975). Even when individual notice to the entire class is given, less
than 2% demand exclusion. See Pomerantz, supra note 53, at 41.
154. The very nature of the class in rule 23 (b)(l)- and (b)(2)-type actions is such that class
members' interests tend to be very similar and thus adequacy of representation is more likely.
See 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1786, at 143 (1972).
155. U.C.A.A. § 8(a) denies a class member the right to opt out if he is a representative, a
counterclaim is pending against the class, or the action is of a type analogous to the federal rule
23(b)(1) or (2).
156. See note 61 supra and accompanying text.
157. But see Donson Stores, Inc. v. American Bakeries Co., 58 F.R.D. 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1973),
which held that counterclaims may not be asserted against absent class members because they
are not parties under rule 13.
158. It seems probable, however, that if the defendant, in order to assure res judicata,
demands a form of notice more expensive than that required by the court the cost of such notice
would necessarily be borne by the defendant. See Sanders v. Levy, 20 F.R. Serv. 2d 1218
(S.D.N.Y. 1975).
159. U.C.A.A. § 7(g). Plaintiffs in the federal courts have unsuccessfully sought to have the
courts minimize notice expenses by shifting part of the administrative costs to the defendant.
One court has, however, held that Eisen IV applies only to postage and mailing, and that the
costs of supplying the names and addresses of the class members may be allocated to the
defendant. Foster v. Maryland State Say. & Loan Ass'n, 369 F. Supp. 843 (D.D.C. 1974). Most
federal courts consider the costs of identifying class members to be part of the expense which
must be borne by the plaintiff under rule 23. See, e.g., Popkin v. Wheelabrator-Frye, Inc., 20
F.R. Serv. 2d 125 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). Plaintiffs' requests to allow notice to be included in the
defendant's regular statement mailings to customers who are also class members have been
consistently rejected. See, e.g., Dennis v. Saks & Co., 20 F.R. Serv. 2d 994 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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The Act also permits class members to request exclusion if the action is
not maintained under the situations described in federal rule 23(b)(1) or
(2).11 Unlike the original draft, the court cannot eliminate a class member's
right to exclusion. 16' Therefore, when the class member is entitled to request
such exclusion, notice requirements should be, to some degree, stricter. If
the interest of the class member in requesting exclusion is more theoretical
than real, however, the court might not require more than a minimally
effective type of notice.
Although the Act mandates some minimal form of notice in every class
action, it adopts a more practical evaluation than federal rule 23 as to who
must receive personal notice. In this respect the UCAA follows that portion
must inevitably
of Mullane which held that the requirements of due process
62
depend upon the circumstances of the particular case.
The notice requirements of the Act are, however, significantly more
restrictive than the recently revised New York Class Action Rule. 63 The
New York rule requires only that notice be reasonable, in terms of its cost,
the resources of the party, and the likelihood that class members will desire
individual control of their own claims.' 64 Moreover, the statute allows the
65
courts discretion to allocate any or all of the notice costs to the defendant.
Nevertheless, the policy underlying the UCAA and the New York rule are
essentially the same, namely to provide a means of adjudicating those
typically modern claims involving individually small but collectively widespread injuries to consumer, environmental, and other collective interests. 11 That policy, embodied in the flexible notice provisions of the UCAA,
to rely on the very extent of his wrong to
does not permit the defendant
67
certification.
class
defeat
B.

Damages

The adoption of a procedural rule permitting fluid recovery involves
several conscious decisions on the part of a legislative body. It implies a
general recognition of the usefulness of the class action device above and
beyond its potential for achieving economies of judicial time and effort. It
signifies a decision that the nature of modern society necessitates an available judicial forum for the redress of small but extremely widespread
wrongs. And, it requires the decision that the deterrent effect of the mass
class action justifies the inherent deficiencies in achieving exact compensation which such an action involves. Moreover, this deterrent effect must be
160. U.C.A.A. § 8(a).
161. ProposedAJniform Class Actions Act, Third Draft, § 7(a).
162. See notes 54-55 supra and accompanying text.
163. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW §§ 901-909 (McKinney 1976).
164. Id. §§ 904(b)-(c).
165. Id. § 904(d).
166. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, REPORT
26 (Feb. 1973), cited in Burman, supra note 153, at 285.
167.

TO THE

1973

LEGISLATURE

See Pomerantz, supra note 53, at 40, for a discussion of the paradox resulting when the

end of protecting the small claimant is defeated by the defendant's insistence on individual
notice to each member of a large class.
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viewed as overriding the added burdens on the courts which fluid recovery
necessarily entails.' 6
The proposed UCAA sets forth in explicit detail the nature and scope of
relief which may be awarded a class and the procedure which the court must
follow in so doing. Fluid recovery is expressly permitted.
Section 15 of the Act 169 permits the court to award any form of relief
consistent with the order of class certification. Thus, in considering whether
to grant certification, the court may consider whether aggregate damage
calculation and distribution makes the class action an efficient method of
adjudication. 70 Requiring the named representative to present a plan detailing the feasibility of such a procedure should allow the court to avert much
168. See Kronisch v. Howard Say. Inst., 133 N.J. Super. 124, 335 A.2d 587, 596 (1975), in
which the court remarked that the class action's "savings of time, effort and expense will be at
the cost of an additional burden upon the court." This view reflects a marked deviation from
the conclusion arrived at in the federal courts that the "saving of time, effort, and expense"
which a rule 23(b)(3) action should achieve are economies of court time and effort rather than
those of the plaintiff class. See, e.g., In re Hotel Tel. Charges, 500 F.2d 86 (9th Cir. 1974);
Berley Drefus & Co., 43 F.R.D. 397 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
169. U.C.A.A. § 15 provides:
Relief Afforded

(a) The court may award any form of relief consistent with the order of certification including, but not limited to, equitable, declaratory, or monetary relief to
individual class members or the class in a lump sum or installments, to which the
party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled.
(b) Damages fixed by a minimum measure of recovery provided by any statute
cannot be recovered in a class action.
(c) If a class is awarded a monetary judgment, the distribution shall be determined as follows:
(1) the parties shall list as expeditiously as possible all members of the class
whose identity can be determined without expending a disporportionate share of
the recovery; (2) the reasonable expense of identification and distribution shall
be paid, with the court's approval, from the funds to be distributed; (3) the court
may order steps taken to minimize the expense of identification; (4) the court
shall supervise, and may grant or stay the whole or any portion of, the execution
of the judgment and the collection and distribution of funds to the members of
the class as their interests warrant; (5)(A) The court shall determine what
amount of the funds available for the payment of the judgment cannot be
distributed to members of the class individually because they have not been
identified or located or because they do not claim or prove the right to money
apportioned to them. That amount shall be distributed in whole or in part by the
court after hearing to one or more states as unclaimed property or to the
defendant. The court shall consider the following criteria in determining the
amount, if any, to be distributed to a state, and, if any, to the defendant: (i) any
unjust enrichment of the defendant; (ii) the willfulness or lack of willfulness on
the part of the defendant; (iii) the impact of the relief granted on the defendant;
(iv) the pendency of other claims against the defendant; (v) any criminal sanction imposed on the defendant; and (vi) the loss suffered by the plaintiff class.
(B) The court may impose conditions on the defendant with regard to the use
of the money distributed to the defendant to remedy or alleviate the harm done.
(C) The amount to be distributed to a state shall be distributed as unclaimed
property to any state in which is located the last known addresses of the
members of the class to whom distribution cannot be made. If the last known
addresses cannot be ascertained with reasonable diligence the court may determine by other means what portion of the unidentified or unlocated members of
the class were residents of a state. A state shall receive that portion of the
distribution that its residents would have received had they been identified and
located. Before entering an order distributing any part of the amount to a state
the court shall give written notice of its intention to make distribution to the
attorney general of each state if any of its residents were given notice under
Section 7 or 12 and shall afford the attorney general an opportunity to move for
an order requiring payment to the state.
170. Efficiency of adjudication is a necessary condition to the certification of the action.
U.C.A.A. § 2(b)(2); see notes 201-02 infra and accompanying text.
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of the skirmishing over the preliminary manageability issue which has
plagued the federal courts.171
Section 15 permits awarding monetary relief to the class in a lump sum or
installments, thereby adopting the concept of calculating gross damages for
the class as an entity. 72 The Act does not, however, outline any procedures
to be followed in computing such damages. It is not clear, then, whether
such a calculation is limited to exact proof drawn from the defendant's
records alone, or whether a more uncertain method involving statistical
sampling and economic techniques is permissible.173 If calculation of gross
damages must depend on the ability to prove that each class member was
injured in identical measure, either in terms of dollars or by percentage, the
flexibility of fluid recovery will be unnecessarily curtailed. 174
The thrust of section 15 is directed toward the distribution of the lump
sum monetary recovery.175 The parites are required to list all individual class
member claimants whose identities can be determined without expending a
disproportionate share of the recovery176 since cost of identification and

distribution must be subtracted before the funds can be distributed. 77 The
court may also order necessary steps to minimize the expense.17 Such
provisions do not negate the possibility of extensive advertising campaigns

to locate class members where the income from the damage fund itself will
be substantial.
Next, the court is authorized to distribute the funds to class members as
their interests warrant. Before the monies apportioned to identifiable class
members are distributed, however, they are expected to claim and prove
their right to recovery. 179 The court must supervise the distribution during
this phase. While assistance of counsel may be invaluable, careful judicial
supervision is necessary since the process of distribution will obviously not
be adversarial in the true sense. 8 ' Where fluid recovery is contemplated,
171. Section 15 does not, however, require the submission of such a plan.
172. U.C.A.A. § 15(a).
173. In antitrust cases, for example, wide latitude may be allowed in proving the amount of
damage as a matter of public policy. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395
U.S. 100 (1969); Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555 (1931).
Thus, where the class action promotes such a public policy, a more flexible level of proof may
be appropriate.
174. See Melina, supra note 99, at 308.
175. U.C.A.A. § 15(c).
176. Id. § 15(c)(1). The Act, however, gives no guidance as to what constitutes a disproportionate share.
177. Id. § 15(c)(2).
178. Id. § 15(c)(3).
179. Presumably, this would involve the use of standardized proof of claim forms which
would be sent to identifiable class members. For a sample form see Lebedoff, supra note 130,
at 168-69. At what point such forms may be sent and the results of the failure of a class member
to respond have raised problems in the federal courts under rule 23(b)(3). Some federal courts
have required that such forms be sent with the initial notice in order to help litigants assess the
scope of damages. See Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452 (E.D.
Pa. 1968). Other courts, in apparent contradiction to the opt-out provisions of rule 23, have
barred the claims of class members who failed to return the proof of claim forms at the outset of
the suit. See Lamb v. United Sec. Life Co., 59 F.R.D. 25 (S.D. Iowa 1972). Under the UCAA
such a procedure would appear to be improper where fluid recovery is contemplated since the
scope of damages to the class as a whole does not depend on proof of damages by each
individual class member.
180. See Miller, supra note 26, at 508.

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 31

therefore, the standards for adequacy of counsel may be heightened.',
Court supervision should entail some effort to minimize fraudulent claims
for recovery;'82 where an exceptionally large class is involved, such a
83
procedure might be modeled upon the Pfizer settlement.
Those funds which cannot be distributed to individual class members
may, after a hearing, be distributed in whole or in part by the court in one of
three ways." 8 First, the fund may be turned over to a state as unclaimed
property in proportion to the number of unlocated class members whose last
known address was within that state.' 85 Where class members are unidentified, the court may determine "by other means" what proportion of
unidentified class members were residents of that state. 8 6 Notice is to be
given to attorneys general of any state in which notice was given to the class
members, allowing such officials to move for an order directing payment to
the state.' 87 This particular provision allows the court to avoid the burden of
developing an innovative "next best" distribution model for which its resources or competence is not adequate. Such a means of distributing the
unclaimed portion of the fund is analogous to the proceedings in Bebchick 88
whereby an already extant regulatory authority was given management of
the fund. The Act does not provide for any particular utilization of the funds
by the state, but such monies could be used to assist consumer protection
agencies, agencies which deal with the regulation of the subject matter of
the suit, or even to augment the resources of the courts which handle mass
89
class actions.
The court may also return the whole or any part of the unclaimed damage
fund to the defendant."19 In doing so, it may require the defendant to use the
monies to remedy or alleviate the harm done.191 This provision apparently
authorizes the court to require price reductions or rebates to consumers as
well as more innovative cy pres remedies. Such a procedure may be most
appropriate where the class members can be expected to continue use or
consumption of the defendant's services. Such a procedure will demand
more of the court in terms of fashioning the conditions imposed on the
defendant and supervising the ultimate disposition of the fund.
181. The importance of vigorous and committed assistance of counsel was emphasized by
the special master overseeing the Pfizer settlement distribution. Lebedoff, supra note 132, at
152.
182. Effective claim verification procedures have been advanced as one means of minimizing the risks of eliminating the jury trial as to each claim. Miller, supra note 27, at 508.
183. Those procedures included: (I) a study by a research firm to determine how claimants
arrived at their claims; (2) probability samples; (3) auditing of claim forms above $50; and (4)
checks by a medical expert of antibiotics claimed to have been used for specific diseases. See
Lebedoff, supra note 132, at 163.
184.

U.C.A.A. § 15(c)(5)(A)-(C).

185. The extent to which such a procedure achieves the cy pres goal of benefiting a "next
best class" is questionable. When deterrence is considered important, however, it is not
unprecedented. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(c) (1970).
186. Apparently this permits the court to rely on statistical analysis of the defendant's
records.

187. Distribution of the fund to the state rather than to the defendant will be most appropriate where the nature of the defendant's wrong violates clearly established public policy or the
extent of the wrong suffered is widespread.
188. 318 F.2d 187 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 913 (1963).
189. See Federal Consumer Class Action Legislation, supra note 94, at 24.
190. U.C.A.A. § 15(c)(5)(A).
191. Id. § 15(c)(5)(B).
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Alternatively, the court may simply return the unclaimed portion of the
damages to the defendant without any conditions. 192 In determining whether
and in what amount the fund is to be returned the court is required to
consider any unjust enrichment of the defendant' 93 and any criminal sanction imposed on the defendant. 94 Thus, the court may appropriately consider the nature of the harm committed by the defendant and whether the
deterrent effect of withholding the unclaimed damage fund is needed. The
court is also to consider the loss suffered by the plaintiff class as a whole,
apparently both in amount and in nature, in determining whether such
deterrent function is proper.'9 5
The court must also consider the willfulness or lack of willfulness of the
defendant's action. 196 This underscores the quasi-penal nature of fluid recovery. Defendants who unintentionally injure a class, however widespread
the injury, may thus be able to avoid the potentially severe consequences of
fluid recovery. 97 Moreover, the court is required to evaluate the very
harshness of such consequences on the particular defendant. Section 15
instructs the court to consider the impact of the relief to be granted on the
defendant and the pendency of other claims against the defendant in deciding whether to return any portion of the fund. 98 Where the aggregate
damages might be expected to cripple the defendant, return of the unclaimed
funds may be appropriate. In keeping with this rationale, the Act specifically
prohibits class action recovery under any statute which fixes a minimum
measure of recovery for violations. 199
One commentator has suggested that such a model may be applied in
either of two ways: first, full liability would be the norm with mitigation
reserved for relatively exceptional circumstances; or secondly, full liability
would be reserved for the worst offenders with reduction of liability for
most other defendants. 200 Neither model appears appropriate as a standard,
however, since the enumerated factors which a court must consider underscore the need to decide each particular case on the facts. Undoubtedly, a
potential for inconsistent decisions exists where such broad discretion is
vested in the trial court. Nevertheless, the Act clearly seeks to balance the
policy of preventing unjust enrichment and promoting maximum deterrence
with the policy against using the class action for harshly punitive ends.
In certifying a class action, a court following the procedures outlined in
the proposed UCAA need not find the class action device is "superior" but
must find that it will promote "the fair and efficient adjudication of the
controversy." 2 1 The factors which the court must consider in making such a
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

Id. § 15(c)(5)(A).
Id. § 15(c)(5)(A)(i).
Id. § 15(c)(5)(A)(v).
Id. § 15(c)(5)(A)(vi).
Id. § 15(c)(5)(A)(ii).
The court must, however, balance this factor against the loss suffered by the plaintiff

class.
198. U.C.A.A. §§ 15(c)(5)(A)(iii), (iv).
199. Id. § 15(b). See notes 110-11 supra and accompanying text for a similar judicial
approach to class actions brought pursuant to such statutes.
200. See Comments on The Proposed Uniform Class Actions Act, 4 CLASS AcT. REP. 181,
187 (1975).
201. U.C.A.A. § 2(b)(2).
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determination include "whether the management of the class action poses
unusual difficulties" and "whether the claims of individual class members
are sufficient in the amounts or interests involved, in view of the complexities and expenses of the litigation, to afford significant relief to the members of the class. ' 20 2 The former factor is somewhat confusing since the
court is apparently not required to find affirmatively that the class action is
manageable, but only that it is not unusually unmanageable. Given the
scarce case precedent for the actual conduct of mass class actions, it is not
clear what "unusual difficulties" means. Since the Act expressly allows
fluid recovery, however, "unusual difficulties" would seem to imply problems beyond those of relatively simple damage calculations and distribution.
The latter factor clearly adopts that portion of In re Hotel Telephone
Cha rges 20 3 which weighs the burdens placed on the court by the proposed
litigation against the ultimate potential benefit to the individual class members. Thus, where individual recovery is likely to be eaten up by administrative costs of distribution, the class action is not appropriate, even if litigants
are willing to vindicate their principles at the expense of their pocketbooks.
Moreover, if individual claims are de minimis from the outset and the
litigation is likely to be complex and time consuming, certification is apparently improper. The Act clearly does not contemplate that the deterrent
effect of the mass class action, in itself, apart from compensation of individual class members, will justify significant burdens on judicial resources.
To the extent that emphasis is placed on individual recovery and administrative burdens, the availability of the fluid recovery device to justify a finding
of efficiency will be limited.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Under the UCAA the emphasis has clearly shifted away from the mere
achieving of time, expense, and administrative economies which underlay
the structure of federal rule 23. Instead, the potential of the class action to
provide a forum for vindication of small but widespread claims and to deter
modern mass wrongs has been facilitated. In actual practice the class action
may not live up to that promise. Serious questions concerning the ability of
the court to manage the increased burden and of defendants to protect
themselves from disastrous liabilities without stricter procedural protections
are evident. Nevertheless, the UCAA has at least provided the judicial tools
to attempt solutions to those questions in order to realize that promise.

202. Id. §§ 3(11), (13).
203. 500 F.2d 86, 91 (9th Cir. 1974).

